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Based on the idea that mood helps to tune cognitive processes to current demands,
we hypothesised that mood should influence the abstraction level in which people
think about behaviour, and that such mood-induced differences in cognitive
attention should be manifested in behaviour descriptions. In this study, participants
re-described a number of daily behaviours in their own words after a mood
manipulation. As predicted, people in a positive mood were more likely to re-
describe behaviours in general why terms, whereas people in a negative mood were
relatively more likely to re-describe behaviours in specific how terms. The findings
are discussed with respect to the role of mood in processes of behaviour regulation.
When thinking about, for example, writing a scientific paper, a person can think about
many different features of this behaviour. One can think about the general goals that are
pursued with this behaviour (e.g., ``getting published'', ``being a scientist''). Alter-
natively, one can think about the specific means to accomplish it (e.g., ``typing words'',
``writing an introduction''). These examples demonstrate that one can think about
behaviour at different levels of abstraction. That is, the second set of examples entails
more specific and feasible representations of behaviour than the first set, which entails
more general and abstract representations. The question we address here is whether a
person's mood influences the level of specificity or generality to which one will cogni-
tively tune when thinking about simple acts of behaviour. Based on the body of research
that has demonstrated how mood influences cognitive processes (for an overview, see
Martin & Clore, 2001), we predicted that mood should influence a person's interpretation
of a simple act. This, in our view, is an important issue as it may shed more light on the
role of mood in processes of behaviour regulation, an issue that, to our knowledge, has
not as yet been addressed empirically.
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Mood and representations of behavior
Why would mood influence a person's thoughts about an act of behaviour? Previous
research has amply demonstrated that mood influences people's style of information
processing (Bless, 2000, 2001; Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 1990;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 1996). These lines of research demonstrate that people in a
positive, happy mood tend to process information in a more heuristic and global manner
(Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Isen, 1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989). A pro-
cessing style that is argued to be paired with a global focus, and a reliance on generic,
abstract knowledge (Bless, 2001; Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001a; Clore et al., 2001b;
Fiedler, 2001; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Schwarz & Skurnik, 2003). In contrast, people in a
negative, or sad mood tend to use a more effortful, careful, systematic, and detail-oriented
processing style (Bless et al., 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Schwarz, 1990). This is a
style of processing that is paired with a narrowed focus of attention and a shift to a lower
level of abstraction (Bless, 2001; Clore et al., 2001a, 2001b; Gasper & Clore, 2002;
Fiedler, 2001; Schwarz & Skurnik, 2003).
As a consequence of these different processing styles it has, for instance, been shown
that people in a positive mood, compared to people in a negative mood, are more likely to
rely on general knowledge like stereotypes in social judgements (Bless, Schwarz, &
Wieland, 1996; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & SuÈsser, 1994; Park & Banaji, 2000) and acti-
vated scripts (Bless et al., 1996). Similarly, individuals in a positive, compared to a
negative mood, show more clustering of information into broad, general trait categories in
their recall of person descriptions (Bless, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992). Also, happy
individuals tend to employ relatively more broad and inclusive categories when sorting
exemplars into categories, and to use a smaller number of piles to sort coloured chips
(Isen & Daubman, 1984).
In a similar vein, we expect that mood may influence a person's thoughts about acts of
behaviour. In accordance with the idea that cognitions of behaviour are organised in a
hierarchical structure (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Gollwitzer &
Moskowitz, 1996; Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Wegner
& Vallacher, 1986), a person can have cognitive representations of behaviour in mind that
vary in abstraction. On the one hand, a person can concern him or herself with behaviour
at a general, high level (i.e., getting published). The person then focuses on a more
general understanding of the action, indicating why the action is performed (cf. Vallacher
& Wegner, 1987). On the other hand, a person can concern him or herself with behaviour
at a more specific, low level (i.e., typing words). The individual then focuses attention at
the details or specifics of the activity itself, indicating how it is performed (cf. Vallacher
& Wegner, 1987).
As discussed above, a person in a positive mood is most likely to adopt a
global focus and to rely on generic and abstract knowledge (Bless, 2000, 2001).
This processing style promotes interpretation of the stimuli in more general terms,
while attention to specifics is low. Thus, when thinking about an act of behaviour,
a happy individual is most likely to access general understandings and meanings asso-
ciated with the specific act. This is equivalent to generating thoughts about why an
act is performed (i.e., to access cognitive representations that are at a more abstract
level in the hierarchy).
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A person in a negative mood is more likely to process information in a detail-oriented
and analytic style (Bless, 2000, 2001). When thinking about a given act of behaviour, an
individual in a negative mood is most likely to think about the details and specifics of the
act. Rather than interpreting an act in general terms, one is more likely to specify it more
locally and concretely, which is equivalent to thinking about how an act is performed.
One moves to thinking about the behaviour at a lower level of abstraction.
From the above considerations, we conclude that a positive mood will be paired with a
stronger tendency to activate general representations of behaviour, that is, the more
abstract understandings and meanings of behaviour (why). And, by contrast, a negative
mood will be paired with an increased tendency to activate specific representations of
behaviour, that is, concrete and more localised means of behaviour (how). This is a
prediction that is consistent with the literature on mood and cognitive processing (Martin
& Clore, 2001). It can also be made on the basis of theoretical accounts concerned with
behaviour regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990; Valla-
cher & Wegner, 1987; Wegner & Vallacher, 1986). Yet, the issue whether mood influ-
ences a person's thoughts about simple acts of behaviour has, to our knowledge, not been
demonstrated empirically. It is however important, because it seems likely that the
cognitive representation a person has in mind influences behaviour control and overt
behaviour. The outcome of such a study may therefore shed light on the role of mood in
processes of behaviour control.
The hypothesis was investigated by using a novel method in which participants were
first induced in either a positive or a negative mood by means of a short film clip.
Subsequently, participants were asked to re-describe a number of ordinary, daily beha-
viours in their own words. The translations-in-other-words were coded for being
descriptive of either the how (subordinate) or why (superordinate) of the behaviour in the
given items.
METHOD
Participants and design
A total of 56 Dutch undergraduates at the Free University of Amsterdam participated in
this computer mediated study (20 male, 36 female, M = 21 years old). They received 5
euros for their participation in this study, and an unrelated subsequent study. On entrance
to the lab they were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (mood
condition: positive, negative) 6 2 (behaviour item order: order 1, order 2) between-
participant design.
Materials and procedure
Participants were seated in individual cubicles with a computer. They were informed that
all instructions and tasks were to be presented on the monitor.
Mood manipulation. To induce a positive or negative mood, participants were
shown one short film clip on the computer screen, purportedly to examine emotions, and
mood changes over time. To induce a positive mood we showed participants a scene from
the Walt Disney cartoon Jungle Book (in which a little boy, Mowgli, is dancing and
singing a jazzy song with Baloo the bear). To induce a negative mood we showed
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participants a scene from the movie ``Sophie's Choice'' (in which a mother is forced to
choose between one of her children to be sent on a train to a concentration camp). The
film clips were shown on the monitor of an I-mac (400 Mhz) and they last approximately
7 minutes.
It is inevitable that the film clips, besides their different effects on mood, differ on
some other modalities. However, in a series of earlier studies in which these film clips
were used (Beukeboom & Semin, 2004), we had obtained consistent effects in different
replications using other film clips, as well as a completely different type of mood
manipulation. This provided evidence that it is indeed the positive and negative mood
induced by these clips that is causing any effects, rather than possible other variations
between the clips.
Although a neutral baseline condition is normally useful to detect the direction of an
effect, in the case of mood it is difficult to define what neutral means. Namely, neutral
here is not the absence of mood. Consequently, conclusions about the direction of a mood
effect are highly dependent on the type and relative effect of the manipulation that is used
in the condition labelled as ``neutral''. In the light of this, we did not find it informative to
include a neutral mood condition. Instead, we aimed to focus on the relative difference
between positive and negative mood.
Mood measure. Directly after the film clip participants were asked whether they
experienced, at this very moment: (1) negative feelings and (2) positive feelings.
Participants responded by using the mouse to click an answer on two 9-point scales that
were anchored (1) not at all, (9) very much. Mood scores consisted of the mean score on
these two scales (Cronbach's a = .95).
Behaviour re-description questionnaire. Next, participants were asked to continue
with an ostensibly unrelated experiment. They were instructed to take a questionnaire out
of an envelope lying next to the computer. Participants read the following instruction on
the questionnaire (partly based on Vallacher & Wegner, 1989): ``This study is about how
people think about behaviour. Any behaviour can be identified in different ways. For
example a behaviour such as `typing a letter', can be described as `pushing keys' or as
`expressing thoughts'. We are interested in the way in which you would like to describe a
number of different behaviours. We are not interested in your opinion about these
activities. Instead, we are interested in the way in which you would like to describe them
in other words. In the task you get a number of sentences in the I-format, with a certain
behaviour. It is your task to describe them in different way, with the first thing that comes
to your mind''. Next, a few examples were given and participants were encouraged not to
think about them too much, but to rely on their first inspiration when describing each
behaviour.
The questionnaire consisted of a list of 18 items. These 18 behaviour-items were
selected on the basis of a pilot study (N = 18), in which 45 items were tested. The 45 tested
items were partly taken from Vallacher and Wegner's (1989) Behaviour Identification
Form, and partly new items. We selected those items that resulted in a more or less equal
number of how and why translations-in-other-words, and in a relatively small number of
other-translations (translations that did not fall into either the how or why category, such as
synonyms, opinions, consequences). The experimental items were: (1) I make a grocery
list; (2) I wash my clothes; (3) I measure a room for carpeting; (4) I am taking care of the
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plants; (5) I lock a door; (6) I brush my teeth; (7) I call someone on the phone; (8) I ride a
bike; (9) I buy flowers; (10) I read the newspaper; (11) I eat a sandwich; (12) I send a
postcard; (13) I ring a doorbell; (14) I drink tea; (15) I do the dishes; (16) I cook macaroni;
(17) I greet someone; (18) I send an e-mail. Participants received a questionnaire with either
order 1, which was the random order as presented here, or order 2, which was the opposite
order. After filling out the questionnaire they continued with another unrelated study, after
which they were debriefed, thanked, and paid.
Dependent variables
Coding the translations-in-other-words: How vs. Why. The dependent variable
consisted of the number of how, and why sentences that participants produced in
``translating'' the 18 behaviours. To obtain these two variables the translations-in-other-
words were coded, blind to experimental condition, by two independent judges into either
(1) how, (2) why, or (3) other. The two judges used the following rules to decide in which
of the three categories a translation belonged (see Liberman & Trope, 1998). (1) How:
How-translations describe the means by which the behaviour in the item is conducted.
The content of these behaviour translations is subordinate to, or more specific than, the
content of the item. Therefore they fit in the structure: [item] by [translation], e.g.,
``locking the door'' by ``turning the key''. Translations referring to time or place (2.3%
of total number) were also coded in this category. (2) Why: Why translations describe the
ends to which the behaviour in the item is conducted. The content of these behaviour
translations are superordinate to, or more general than, the content of the item. Therefore
they fit the structure (translation) by (item) (e.g., ``arranging safety'' by ``locking the
door''). (3) Other: These translations do not fit either the how-to or why-to category.
These are, for example, exact synonyms that are descriptive of behaviour that is done
simultaneously with the activity in the item, or are descriptive of both how and why.
The two judges agreed on 88.9% of the translations (Cohen's kappa = .80). In 7.3% of
the cases, one judge coded the translation to fit either the how or why category, whereas
the other judge coded the translation as fitting the other category. Only 3.8% of the
translations were classified by one judge as how, and by the other judge as why. These
cases were resolved by discussion between the judges.
RESULTS
Manipulation check
On the basis of an initial analysis of the mean mood score two participants were excluded
from further analyses, because of extreme deviating mood scores (more than 3.5 standard
deviations from the mean in the mood condition). Further analyses of the mood scores
showed that participants in the positive mood condition reported a significantly more
positive mood (M = 7.97, SD = 0.82) than participants in the negative mood condition (M
= 2.8, SD = 1.43), t(52) = 16.56, p < .001, which indicates that the mood manipulation
was successful.
How and why translations-in-other-words
In total, 34.9% of the total translations was coded as fitting the how-to category and
57.9% was coded as fitting the why-to category, which shows that in general people were
1246 BEUKEBOOM AND SEMIN
more likely to focus on the superordinate why aspects. This is in line with Action
Identification Theory findings that show that preference is usually given to high levels of
action identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Only 7.2% of the total number of
translations did not fit either the how or why category, and were classified in the other
category. The number of why and how translations are strongly interdependent (r(54) =
7.93, p < .001), given the relatively small number of other translations. In the following
analyses, the number of how translations is used as the dependent variable. This produces
the same, but opposite, effects as the number of why translations.
It was predicted that people in a negative mood would produce relatively more how
descriptions, whereas people in a positive mood would produce relatively more why
descriptions. The number of how translations was subjected to a univariate ANOVA with
Mood (positive, negative) and Sex (male, female) as between-participants variables. The
variable ``order of items'' (order 1, order 2) did not show any main nor interaction effects
(all Fs < 1.1, n.s.), and is therefore not considered here. The analyses revealed the
predicted main effect of mood condition, F(1, 50) = 4.15, p < .05. In Table 1 the means of
the different types of translations are depicted. One can see that participants in the
negative mood condition translated the behaviours, as expected, more often in how terms,
compared to participants in the positive mood condition. The exact opposite effect is true
for the number of why translations. In the positive mood condition more why translations
were made than in the negative mood condition. No differences were observed for the
number of other translations.
Not directly relevant to the current research questions, is the observation of a marginal
main effect of participant Sex, F(1, 50) = 3.77, p = .06. Women translated the behaviours
more often in how terms (M = 7.11, SD = 5.8), compared to men (M = 4.68, SD = 4.76).
This marginal effect was, however, completely orthogonal to the effect of Mood con-
dition, no interaction was observed, F(1, 50) < 1, n.s.
TABLE 1
Mean (and standard deviations) of the number of How, Why, and Other
translations-in-other-words of the 18 behaviours, in the positive and
negative mood conditions
Mood condition
Translation Positive (n = 29) Negative (n = 25) F(1, 50) Sign.
How (specific) M 5.00 7.72 4.15 p < .05
(SD) (4.96) (5.93)
Why (general) M 11.66 8.84 4.02 p < .05
(SD) (5.67) (6.09)
Other M 1.31 1.44 < 1 n.s.
(SD) (2.24) (2.24)
Note: N = 54. Depicted F-values are based on univariate ANOVAs. There was one
missing value in the positive mood condition.
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DISCUSSION
The results of this study show that, when describing behaviour in other words, people in a
positive mood (compared to negative mood) have a stronger tendency to describe
behaviours with a focus on general, superordinate aspects (i.e., why-to-perform-it). When
provided with a behaviour description, they presumably access general and abstract
cognitive representations of the behaviour, which is reflected in their translations. In a
negative mood, by contrast, people are less likely to describe behaviours with a focus on
why aspects, and, compared to people in a positive mood, their tendency to describe
behaviour with a focus on specific aspects is significantly stronger. When provided with a
behaviour, people in a negative mood presumably access more specific and feasible
cognitive representations of the behaviour, reflecting the how-to-perform-it. Most
probably, these effects arise from the different processing styles that positive and negative
mood induce (Bless, 2000, 2001; Clore et al., 2001a, 2001b).
Mood and processes of behaviour regulation
It seems likely that the observed effects of mood on the abstraction of behaviour
representations are part of a functional behaviour regulation process. Mood has been
argued to serve an adaptive purpose by providing information about the nature of the
present situation, and about a person's progress in goal pursuit (Bless, 2000; Carver &
Scheier, 1990; Frijda, 1988; Schwarz, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 1996).
Negative affect is argued to arise in problematic situations, and when progress towards a
goal is perceived as unsatisfactory. Positive affect is experienced in situations that pro-
vide no problems, and progress toward a desired goal is perceived as satisfactory or rapid
(Carver & Scheier, 1990; Clore et al., 2001a). Simultaneously with changes in mood,
people are thought to tune their cognitive processes to the most functional processing
style, and thus adjust to the demands of the situation. It is therefore functional if people,
simultaneously with changes in mood, adjust their level of behaviour control and the
specificity of the acts of behaviour they pursue (Carver & Scheier, 1990). A careful way
of attending to one's behaviour is required in problematic (i.e., negative mood) situations.
When a negative mood is experienced it seems most adaptive to access and rely upon
more specific and feasible representations of the behaviour that indicate how an action
should be performed. Namely, when people have the required specific behaviours in mind
then it is likely to be performed effectively (Gollwitzer 1993; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz,
1996; Pham & Taylor, 1999; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Wegner & Vallacher, 1986). By
contrast, people can rely on their experience with a behaviour when the situation is
experienced as positive or benign, and when progress toward a goal is satisfactory (i.e.,
positive mood situations). In a positive mood, progress towards a goal does not require
attention to specifics of the activity since no problem is signalled. Consequently, beha-
viour control is shifted from the specifics of the activities to the general overarching goal,
and behaviour can presumably be conducted more automatically (Aarts & Dijksterhuis,
2000; Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).
Aside from the possible implications for behaviour regulation, the present findings
may also provide some knowledge about the effects of mood on how people commu-
nicate about behaviour. The presumed processing differences between people in positive
and negative mood were reflected in the way in which acts of behaviours were described.
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People in a positive mood were more likely to re-describe behaviour in general, abstract
terms, whereas people in a negative mood were relatively more likely to re-describe the
behaviour in concrete and specific terms. In the light of these and other findings (see
Beukeboom & Semin, 2004) it seems that mood can have a profound effect on the way in
which people communicate about their own and other people's behaviour. For instance,
we know from the extant literature that the abstractness or concreteness in which people
talk about behaviour shapes the types of inferences a receiver of such messages forms
(e.g., Semin & De Poot, 1997; Werkman, Wigboldus, & Semin, 1999; Wigboldus, Semin,
& Spears, 2000). Thus, all other things being equal, a happy person talking about an act of
behaviour is likely to convey different information about this behaviour than a person in a
negative mood. Possibly, such effects of mood in communicating about behavior may
eventually influence the performance of the discussed activities as well.
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